Essay for PCC Course, The Evolution of Consciousness
taught by David Ulansey and Sean Kelly at California Institute of Integral Studies,
written by © Caroline Webb, May 2002




No subject, other than the subject of God, has caused as much discussion, dissension and general heating of the brain as Evolution. That the two share such a power of response in the human mind is obviously no surprise. Human beings are self-aware, and they want to know how it has happened, whether someone or something was responsible, and what should be the appropriate attitude towards self, others and the planet. In their answers to these questions, science and religion vie for adherents. Both are capable of providing some answers, but they remain significantly dis-united and ill at ease with one another, and as a result today's world is in the midst of the biggest identity crisis ever to strike the human species. Indeed, is it correct to think of ourselves as a species, amongst other species, just more "intelligent" as Darwinian thinking would have it ? Or is it more appropriate to follow the thought of Teilhard de Chardin who boldly stepped where few others have dared, and using the facts accrued through scientific discovery and analysis, has proposed that human beings are a development of the cosmos itself?

The distinction is of the utmost significance, for at stake is not simply the quality of life for human beings but the continued survival of the vast wealth of non-human forms of life, built up to its greatest level of diversity since life began on the planet. The two issues are bound together so tightly that no separation can be made. Our destiny here is one with the destiny of all other organisms, be it rapid, be it slow. But the academy has, with few exceptions, not come to recognise this and address it. Instead we now have a situation within education as a whole, through all levels of sophistication, that resembles more nearly that of " fiddling while Rome burns" than anything else. The decision to be made about the meaning and character of Evolution is a do or die decision. The fate of the Earth hangs in balance while the human cannot decide whom to believe, how to interpret the evidence, or how to feel the reality of evolution from within. In the vacuum, actions of immense significance for the future unfolding of evolution as a whole take place without any sense of cosmology, that narrative-based response to existence which provides for an orientation out of which an ethics naturally forms, and by which not simply survival of all life, but its prolonged flourishing, in freedom and ebullience, may be created.

In all this, the work of Teilhard de Chardin stands out as a significant voice, not just in the intellectual and spiritual history of the twentieth century, but I would suggest in the entire history of thought. For Teilhard confronted the dizzying realisation of history and evolution (something that in previous generations, prior to Darwin, Einstein and Hubble was only intuited, not studied) and faced it head on, responding in equal measure from his deep spirituality and from his scientific curiosity. From this fully human response, balanced between our two major modes of intelligence - the intellectual and the spiritual, by which I include our emotionality, or heart - Teilhard was enabled to penetrate the confusions of our era surrounding evolutionary theory. In The Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard reveals what is possible when the implication of evolution is taken in fully, absorbed and integrated, and a synthesis of imagination and insight brought forward into view.

In this paper I shall attempt to reflect upon this extraordinary work through examining two writers from science and philosophy who have responded to it: immunologist and philosophy of science writer Peter Medawar, and philosopher Stephen Toulmin. By such examination I hope to highlight key elements at work in the overall ferment and problematique that the facts of our evolution present us with.

Before approaching these thinkers, however, it is necessary to present certain core ideas expressed in the book The Phenomenon of Man. Unless we listen carefully to Teilhard's propositions, we are likely to commence, continue and end in confusion about just what he is doing in this book. In the Preface, having pointed out that science itself has revealed " beyond all doubt that there is no fact which exists in pure isolation", a surely uncontroversial point, Teilhard is clear that in any attempt seeking to give a general scientific interpretation of the universe as a whole, (in common with philosophy and religion which also seek general interpretations), the aura of subjectivity is unavoidable. He claims that subjectivity is present in the work of observation and interpretation at any level, however narrow the field of view, and that there is necessarily a " complex of assumptions" involved in all levels of scientific investigation. Unlike most scientific discourse, which refrains from stating its primary assumptions, Teilhard makes clear that for him, his science is based on two core ideas:
" The first is the primacy accorded to the psychic and to thought in the stuff of the universe, and the second is the 'biological' value attributed to the social fact around us. The pre-eminent significance of man in nature and the organic nature of mankind; these are two assumptions that one may start by trying to reject, but without accepting them, I do not see how it is possible to give a full and coherent account of the phenomenon of man." (1)

If we stayed with our first impression of what he is saying here, we would likely interpret the words
' psychic' and ' thought' to mean the phenomena confined to human mental experience, but this is a mistake. For Teilhard, the energy which drives the universe is a single but differentiated force and he characterises that with the original Greek meaning of 'psyche' which is ' soul', something that is far larger than the human and which is essentially mysterious or ineffable. It is certainly holistic. He does not use these words however. He proposes that there is a " universal will to live" and that this
"converges and is hominised in [man]." This 'will to live' has found expression on planet Earth but may not be divorced from the wider context of the cosmos and its structures. It is bound up in the way that matter organises itself, the intrinsic qualities that matter displays. Energy at its most general, which must include the various forms of matter (elementary particle, atom, molecule and cell) is synthetically conceived as having two aspects: an inner and an outer. He calls the two aspects 'radial' and 'tangential' respectively. These two forms of energy are in interaction, in a 'granular' mode, from the atom through to organisms. The ' within' is not viewed as a seamless, nebulous stream, existing separately from material structure. On the contrary, in 'granular' fashion, it is attached to and co-extensive with the actual structure of atom, molecule and cell. By definition, it is invisible and unamenable to measurement. The nature of the interior 'space'--its 'psychic' power-- is derived from the overall conditions in which atoms are in aggregation. In space, making up suns and galaxies and dust clouds, there is no confining limit such as there is when a planet is formed. The importance of a closed spherical environment in Teilhard's scheme is critical. However, it has to be acknowledged that not just any sphere is all that is necessary for life to emerge, as our study of the other planets in our solar system have made clear. The conditions that appear to be necessary for the emergence of life are very finely-tuned.

However, assuming, as we must, that it is possible for conditions to become life-conducive at the large scale, at the small scale we can resume the exploration of Teilhard's perspective. He says:
" We are seeking a qualitative law of development that from sphere to sphere should be capable of explaining, first of all the invisibility, then the appearance, and then the gradual dominance of the within in comparison to the without of things." (2) In other words we are seeking to understand the structural underpinning that has the power to create full human consciousness, and to do so without recourse to anything supernatural or miraculous. Teilhard is seeking to understand the growth of both complexity and of consciousness and he argues that due to the intrinsic duality of energy-- its twin faces of matter and psyche (or thought)--he perceives a " Law of complexity and consciousness"

The attribution of an invisible 'within' to all forms of matter is argued by Teilhard as a reality which grows in proportion to the complexity of the relationships between the 'granules' (particles, atoms, molecules, cells and so on). The greater the synthesis of matter, i.e., its complexity of structure, the deeper the psychic space thus generated becomes. As psychic power, even the highly elementary psychic power of such basic things as molecules, or prokaryotes, increases, so the spontaneity--or what we could recognise as creativity--increases. There is a curve of increasing degrees of freedom that is concurrent with the growth of complexity and is responsible for that growth. Teilhard speaks of " non-measurable spontaneity" breaking through and revealing itself, the more dense the relationships between granules become, that spontaneity being an inherent creativity arising out of the overall play of different centers of consciousness. The centers are in relationship with one another, according to the level of structure involved. There is natural affinity of type and structure. Complexity develops as structures become nested in larger structures and at all times there is dynamic relationship between centers and surroundings or environment, the environment becoming eventually a very complicated web of life. Thus Teilhard is drawn to present evolution as a process of convergence. The universe has a psychically convergent structure, a kind of "curvature", which is both a growth of freedom of action and consequent creativity (for good or for evil in our case) and a growth of union or bonding through successive levels of complexity. Teilhard is clear that this process is not determined but experimental. It proceeds by 'groping', as he calls it. The role of chance is not under-estimated, nor the process of natural selection.

There is a great deal more to Teilhard's thought than these preliminary comments but it is hoped that his vantage point and emphases have been conveyed at least in outline. Having now sketched out very briefly some of the core ideas at work in Teilhard's mind, I think it may be fruitful to continue the exploration of the significance of his book by turning to look at the responses to his ideas from other thinkers. Taking these in the chronological order of their written work in relation to The Phenomenon of Man, Peter Medawar's review article, written sometime around the time he was honored by the Nobel Committee in 1960 for his work in medicine on immunology and organ transplantation, is the first to be considered. (3) It is an important article for it influenced others in science and philosophy, as we shall see in the work of Stephen Toulmin. The intensity of his attack on Teilhard in this piece drew many people's attention and it may be seen as a document with historical significance for its presentation of the response of scientific culture at that time. It is a very emotional piece of writing and testament to the depth of the passions that are aroused by the subject of evolution and its interpretation.

PETER MEDAWAR

In this article, Medawar accuses Teilhard of writing " nonsense, tricked out with a variety of metaphysical conceits" and he " can be excused of dishonesty only on the grounds that before deceiving others he has taken great pains to deceive himself." This is his opening statement and shows us the temper Medawar was in when he put pen to paper about The Phenomenon of Man. The article tone remains sarcastic, insulting, and extraordinarily arrogant and condescending throughout. Medawar achieves the distinction of not only effectively calling Teilhard de Chardin a fool but also those readers " often with well-developed literary and scholarly tastes who have been educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical thought", who he feels have been " taken in" by the book. They too are inadequate to the task of understanding that there is nothing meaningful in any deep sense about evolution and the presence of self-aware beings. Indeed Medawar scorns Teilhard and those readers who have found the work attractive for its depth of thought, taking it upon himself to suggest that because he has found it difficult to understand the argument, they are all merely dazzled by an impression of depth: " It is written in an all but totally unintelligible style, and this is construed as prima-facie evidence of profundity. It is because Teilhard has such wonderful deep thoughts that he's so difficult to follow--really it's beyond my poor brain but doesn't that just show how profound and important it must be?"

This is the tone of Medawar throughout this article. But what, apart from sarcasm and bombast, does he actually have to say about Teilhard's thesis? Well, despite repeated reading of this article the conclusion cannot be avoided that Medawar has very little of concrete substance to say. Indeed at the close of the article he confesses to having felt 'distress and despair' about Teilhard's book and falls into making the allegation that Teilhard's real motive for writing The Phenomenon of Man was " to reconcile the supernatural elements in Christianity with the facts and implications of evolution." Was this Teilhard's goal? Is it a fair criticism? There is no doubt that Teilhard's thesis, encapsulated in the equation ' Evolution = Rise of consciousness' and his other idea that 'Rise of consciousness = Union' are large-scale assertions. Having proposed that there is a fundamental psychic component present at all scale of material existence, he is led to analyse the path of life's evolution into the appearance of hominids and homo sapiens as a passage into ever greater cerebralisation by animals as a whole. But rather than seeing humans as a species with greater intelligence than others and leaving it at that, as science of today prefers to do, he proposes another way of understanding what has happened. It is entirely consistent with his earlier argument.

The birth of living form on the planet is characterised as a phase transition of the material endowment of the cosmos-an irreversible development from a simpler condition to a more complex one. Similarly, rather than describing humanity as a biological feature at the end of a single scale on which all living forms can be mapped, he views the emergence of self-reflexive awareness as another phase transition of equivalent significance to the birth of life, viewed both from the 'within' and from the 'without'. Regarding the Earth as being composed of the conventional divisions of lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere and biosphere, he is led to view the phenomenon of man as a new 'sphere'-the sphere of conscious thought and creativity. He coined the word 'noosphere' to categorise this new force within nature and affecting all nature, a word that derives from the Greek for mind, 'nous'. Viewing evolution in this way, Teilhard, undoubtedly under the influence of his Christian spirituality, rooted in feelings and intuitions that speak particularly of love, came to imagine that the future of humanity contained a fulfilment of potential unity, a further transition of consciousness into more profound psychic expression that he called the Omega point, characterised as an 'attractor', drawing if not all of humanity, then a portion of it, into a state of union, and state of 'being', sufficiently potent to overcome the ultimate effects of entropy, predicted by physics for both planet Earth and the cosmos as a whole, although the latter is still in debate.

Returning to Medawar's comment, made at the end of his article, that The Phenomenon of Man is all about the attempt to reconcile Christianity, and its assortment of supernatural beliefs and doctrines, with the discoveries of science, we may ask where the evidence is in what Teilhard writes that in any way calls upon notions of supernatural action or the idea of God. By my reading of Teilhard, these notions are not present and Medawar is tempted to sling this shot at Teilhard more from his desire to diminish the significance of Teilhard's scale and depth of thought than from an accurate portrayal and in-depth discussion of it. The primary difference, as I see it, between these two men lies in the issue of their different vision of psyche. The attack on Teilhard is made, I believe, out of Medawar's discomfort at the proposition that nature is as much psychic as it is material, that it is both. He attacks this as ' metaphysical nonsense'. Having presented a paragraph summing up Teilhard's thesis, and saying superciliously " I do not propose to criticize the fatuous argument I have just outlined: here, to expound is to expose" he goes on to attempt a rebuttal nevertheless:

"What Teilhard seems to be trying to say is that evolution is often (he says always) accompanied by an increase of orderliness or internal coherence or degree of integration. In what sense is the fertilized egg that develops into an adult human being `higher' than, say, a bacterial cell? In the sense that it contains richer and more complicated genetical instructions for the execution of those processes that together constitute development. Thus Teilhard's radial, spiritual or psychic energy may be equated to `information' or `information content' in the sense that has been made reasonably precise by modern communication engineers. To equate it to consciousness, or to regard degree of consciousness as a measure of information content, is one of the silly little metaphysical conceits I mentioned in an earlier paragraph. Teilhard's belief, enthusiastically shared by Sir Julian Huxley, that evolution flouts or foils the second law of thermodynamics is based on a confusion of thought; and the idea that evolution has a main track or privileged axis is unsupported by scientific evidence."

From this we may deduce that Peter Medawar did not really grasp the arguments laid forth by Teilhard, and the book was beyond him. If organisms are viewed in reductionist terms as the outflow of 'genetical instructions', then of course, the nearest we may expect as some recognition of their obvious psychic or cognitive abilities, is the idea of ' information'. In his blithe acceptance of this notion as being all that is necessary to make nature's organic repertoire coherent and understandable, is betrayed the 'faith' that nature is a machine, and as such may legitimately be investigated with concepts derived from our own mechanical culture. At which point, we turn and ask, Who, here, is really being anthropocentric: Teilhard or Medawar? The answer must be that both are, for there is no escape from our own subjectivity, but the difference between the anthropocentrism of Teilhard and that of Medawar is that the former has made our subjectivity--the phenomenon of conscious being--an explicit starting point for reflection, while the latter is essentially unconscious of it, and unwilling to acknowledge its existence in his own thought. In the ensuing 'muddle', there is a can of worms to be discerned, for by deciding to tackle Teilhard, Medawar has inadvertently opened the window onto the mind within science that is acting without self-examination, and I would suggest, acting still as a teenager might, in defence of a position first adopted in order to overthrow the domination of religion. In other words, there is an issue of human maturity involved in this whole debate over evolution, anthropocentrism and the identity and role of the human being.

The cultural division of nature into disciplines that leads to a supposition that nature is not integral and holistic is another foundational assumption that Medawar articulates, albeit in passing. Referring to Julian Huxley's endorsement of Teilhard's book he says: "Huxley applauds the, in my opinion, mistaken belief that the so-called psycho-social evolution of mankind and the genetical evolution of living organisms generally are two episodes of a continuous integral process." Indeed, when we regard the complex world of molecules and cells, genes and organisms, how are we to find a continuity with our own intense diversity of experience, if we regard everything only through eyes that see objects, that is to say we construe and construct them solely as objects? Medawar's position is consistent with his assumptions, but, as a scientist concerned with intensive investigation of nature, is this inability to perceive continuity acceptable and to be encouraged or is it to be challenged? On the decision by scientists over whether there is a " continuous integral process" hangs our fate, at least in part, for the opinion of scientists is highly regarded within our society. It is a scientific and social issue of immense significance. Assuming there is an integral process, from the birth of the cosmos through to our presence as conscious beings, generates the questions put to nature by scientists. In the absence of such an assumption, the questions are altered and the answers too. The identity of human beings, along with the identity of nature and cosmos as a whole are thereby determined.

Teilhard's book stakes everything on the assertion that human beings are natural to the cosmos and are to be understood as a development of cosmic processes of synthesis and creativity which may be understood as unfolding right now within the very mind and heart of each and every one of us. His book asserts that not only is nature a coherent and integral whole but that human beings are at the very "centre of construction" by the universe. To understand our existence therefore, our arrival on the scene as animals with self-awareness and a massive amount of freedom, we must not ignore this entire historical background and must seek the elements of continuity from which our evolution has proceeded. Those elements may be found through the sciences, Teilhard is clear. But if the sciences are pursued with the idea that nature is not an integral whole, then how could we ever construct a fully coherent account of our existence? Medawar is clear, for his part, that the idea of there being an integral process at work , inclusive of human culture, is mistaken. Thus for him it is inconceivable that there could be such a thing as integral science.

Put this way we begin to see a real problem, not just a matter of emphasis, but a matter of core intellectual approach with, I would argue, necessary ethical implications, in the conventional definitions of what science is and may be. It begins to appear that there is a similar rigidity and dogma, a similar 'faith' (albeit unspoken) as that which characterises the doctrines of religions. The similarity, of course, is no accident. Science is the very child of monotheistic imagination and culture. It struggled to escape and having done so, now stands defiant of the 'parent' who still believes that the cosmos is a whole, one Whole, with multiplicity and finitude as well as unity, and something greater than finitude or death. It would seem that in the struggle to break free of restrictive dogmas, the organic and holistic has been suppressed altogether, while the tendency to rigidity has gone unchanged.

The issue of anthropocentrism and the issue of integralism are bound up with one another. An integral perspective alters the kind of view we take of human beings and the rest of nature. Teilhard argues that when nature is viewed as a whole, and humanity understood to be somehow the " center of construction" of the universe, there is actually an evolution of thought itself. It grows. This is not an anthropocentrism of self-centered superiority. He says:
" By virtue of the quality and the biological properties of thought, we find ourselves situated at a singular point, at a ganglion which commands the whole fraction of the cosmos that is at present within reach of our experience. Man, the centre of perspective, is at the same time the centre of construction of the universe. And by expediency no less than by necessity, all science must be referred back to him. If to see is really to become more, if vision is really fuller being, then we should look closely at man in order to increase our capacity to live. But to do this we must focus our eyes correctly." (4)

Such a comment shows us something important about the motivation of Teilhard, as scientist and as a man. How many scientists are really concerned with the growth of our 'being' ? Are they not more likely concerned with fulfilling the demands of corporations and governments, tailoring their efforts to specific political and economic goals? But Teilhard indicates that at stake is not simply the growth of the human into deeper and fuller consciousness, itself a significant value. He perceives that the more able we are to "see", the more able we may be to survive and thrive. The capacity to live, long into the future, healthily, in a healthy and rich environment of other creatures is directly connected with the intellectual and spiritual approach we take to our ways of investigating nature. If we persist with the avoidance of referring all science back to the human and taking seriously our very presence, in the delusion that we are separate and non-integral with the rest of nature, are we not courting actual disaster for the entire life project? It would seem so.

STEPHEN TOULMIN
Turning now to look at the chapter on Teilhard written by Stephen Toulmin in his book 'The Return to Cosmology' (5), we find reflections upon similar issues that concerned Peter Medawar. The question of anthropocentrism is once again addressed. It would seem that Toulmin is influenced by Medawar's response. As a philosopher rather than a scientist, and one who in later chapters of his book explicitly discusses the issue of divisions between disciplines and the ongoing gulfs between science and religion, it is noticeable that he avoids speaking about Teilhard's foundational claim that there is a 'within' as well as a 'without' to the universe. The idea is dismissed as 'vitalism'. Instead he focuses on whether Teilhard's theory can be called 'science', whether it is founded on "sound science" and lastly if it could be "reconciled with sound science." Given his decision not to address this key idea in the whole argument of Teilhard, it is unsurprising that he finds fault with Teilhard on all three counts.

With regard to the first question, he says that of course scientists concern themselves with historical developments of different kinds, ranging from physico-chemical ones to the physiological or sociological. "Natural science has introduced us to a vast multiplicity of historical changes going on in the countless members of countless galaxies and in the profusion of living species on our own planet." He goes on:

"That much however, gets us only a small part of the way toward the conclusion which Teilhard wishes us to reach. If from the unbounded variety of these historical processes, we choose to select one particular strand as representing the essential drama of the cosmos--namely, that strand of which we ourselves are the end-product--then in so doing we are going beyond anything which science, by itself, gives us any warrant to do. What science can do is to establish the validity of certain universal concepts, which can be applied to all the multiplicity of processes going on in Nature--for example, the concept of historical development. But a 'universal' concept is one thing: a truth about 'the universe' is another. At the very heart of Teilhard's view lies a belief that natural science by itself can reveal to us the Main Road of Cosmic History, leading unambiguously from a pre-biotic cosmos up to the present state of humanity, and pointing firmly onward to a 'hyper-personal' future. The existence of this Main Road, however, was something of which Teilhard was convinced for religious rather than scientific, reasons. We ourselves are not compelled to follow him in this belief, unless the scientific evidence is open to this one religious interpretation alone." (6)

There is much in this passage to take up. We must ask if Toulmin is actually grasping the meaning of Teilhard correctly or imposing his own interpretation. He alleges that Teilhard is convinced for religious reasons rather than scientific ones. By this we may understand that he is referring to the Christian cosmology that traditionally placed humanity within a 'chain of being' that concluded with God, and (prior to Copernicus) at the center of the world. The difficulty for a Jesuit scientist-philosopher to avoid this interpretation is obviously immense. People assume that this cosmology and religion must be driving his entire thought. But as I have said earlier, there is no reference throughout the book The Phenomenon of Man to this traditional system of thought. The work is rather a reflection upon the findings of science and a meta-theoretical argument. If Teilhard is making so much out of the human being, it is not because he is re-stating, in scientific terms, an essentially religious conception, deemed to have over-valued the human, so much as drawing our attention to the phenomenon of human consciousness within the wider context of nature. According to Toulmin this is not admissible. Science may not make any statements about the universe as a whole, it must only draw out universal principles and leave the question of finding any connection between human beings and the cosmos to the department of theology. At least this is the strong implication. This is a problematic position. Not only does it seek to divorce the discoveries of science from any application to the formation of a new cosmology, effectively robbing us of that opportunity, it also leaves us with two incompatible explanatory schemes. Unfortunately for the planet and the well-being of all its creatures, in practice this means the dominance of a non-integral scientific worldview in which respect for nature has been all but destroyed by the effects of an unreflective reductionism operating through the metaphor of machine, allied to a political philosophy of 'progress'. We have a problem, but Toulmin is not the thinker to help us see through all this for he has fallen for categorising Teilhard as a religious man masquerading as a scientist and with the door thus closed, all possibilities of extending the discussion about how else science might be done are cut off.

Toulmin says at the end of his chapter that an irreversible step was taken by Montaigne and Descartes, who tore down the idea based on Christian belief that the world was made for man and that it was all for our convenience, and no one could now discuss humanity as though we had a privileged position in the order of things. He concludes: "Any attempt to reverse the step taken by Montaigne and Descartes, or to find a single unambiguous intention informing the whole course of cosmic history, must be regarded with suspicion." (7) Toulmin then proceeds to judge The Phenomenon of Man to be a work that is one more example of Christian-based natural theology seeking to restore a vision of humanity as the pinnacle of evolution and " cosmic standard-bearer". Accusing Teilhard of this kind of chauvinistic anthropocentrism, he concludes that Teilhard is a writer who has followed Bergson rather than Darwin, is dreaming of a single cosmic drama and has engaged in philosophical wish-fulfilment--a serious charge just short of Medawar's that Teilhard is engaged in deception. For Toulmin, Teilhard is not doing science, nor basing his ideas on sound science and has no hope of reconciling his approach with science. The question of whether he has got the last word on what science is capable of does not occur to him. Science, for Toulmin, is not, ever, to address its questions to the universe as a whole. Thus speaks the mind of Western man in the late 20th century. Alas, the charge of hubris may end up at his door too, for if we have learned anything over the last few hundred years, it is that our thinking evolves. It is moving.

We face a difficulty of history here, and it is an extremely important one. Since the sciences arose within Christian culture in Europe, their development has inevitably been profoundly influenced by that matrix. The discussion of who or what we are, our identity within nature and cosmos, has been conducted against a background that is, of all the world's religions, the most human-centered. No other religion has based itself on a figure as human as that of Jesus of Nazareth as its founder and bound the image of that figure so closely to the vision of God. It leads many people to an oppositional position in which, at all costs, the notion of humanity as any kind of pinnacle or focus by nature is to be avoided, otherwise one is not doing science, one is doing religion. This is Toulmin's position. I would like to argue that the critique is simplistic, insufficient and essentially caught up with that oppositional impetus that created science in the first place, or was part of its growth.

We may surmise that science (and the philosophy that travels alongside it) is still in the grip of an essentially oppositional ideology by the following considerations. First of all there is the prevalence of belief that knowledge is obtained or obtainable without any reference to the one who thinks--the idea that objectivity is possible. Secondly, there is the belief that what may be quantified and measured is the extent of reality that may be known. Thirdly, there is the belief that investigation of nature is only possible through reductionism. Fourthly, there is the belief that there can be no global direction to evolution. Fifthly, there is the fear that if it is conceded that modern evolutionary biology is hitting its head on the ceiling of its model, floundering and unable to account coherently for the success of life to diversify and deepen consciousness to the point of self-awareness, the floodgate to creationism will be opened. Alternatives to this scenario are not yet in sight, except I would suggest, through the diligently non-creationist work of someone like Teilhard de Chardin. In all these points, I discern the outline of a cultural stage of human thought that is still in the grip of an opposition to classical religion and by default unable to address not only the many anomalies of experience deemed 'untrue' or mere delusion, but also the urgent need for a more integral, balanced and mature science.

Toulmin writes as one who is satisfied that evolutionary biology has captured the whole picture:
" The harsh truth is this: so long as genetic variation and natural selection are accepted as the dominant factors in evolution, the zoological processes by which the forms of organic species change, can be interpreted only arbitrarily as displaying evidence of "intention."(8) With the difficulties that have yet to be solved by the two 'dominant factors' becoming ever more evident, the position he takes may be on much less firm ground than he thinks. Although there is no space to develop this point, the evidence looks increasingly as though these factors are not all that is involved in evolutionary process. The charge of arbitrariness may yet return to haunt those who staked their entire philosophy on the convictions of neo-Darwinism.

Toulmin spells his position out further: " If the change from Bergson to Darwin is carried right through, the picture of the totality of cosmic history as a single, directed drama falls to pieces. And once the appearance of unity and directedness in the past course of evolution has been dispelled, any projection of the 'evolutionary process' into the future becomes purely visionary." (9) The difficulty we are in is clear in this statement. In the long shadow of monotheism and Christianity, the choice appears to be an either/or one. Either we see the world as accidentally assembling itself, without any goal and certainly not with the goal of consciousness; the presence of life, in all its forms and our own presence are to be understood as entirely fortuitous. Or we see it as something meaningful, from start to finish, in every aspect, with our own presence confirming a wider process of creativity at work throughout. But as Toulmin's words show, and his chapter as a whole argues, the assertion of an intrinsic meaning to be discovered in the universe is interpreted by him to be a re-statement of religiously-inspired intellectual construction, with all the problems that tarnish and invalidate claims arising from religious traditions. With that prejudice he damns Teilhard as a thinker who is effectively re-iterating Christian doctrine, moved by "human pride" (Toulmin's words) to place man in an unwarranted position of privilege, and a simple-minded 'vitalist'. The damage done by this either/or thinking is severe. The subtlety of Teilhard's argument is entirely missed.

Teilhard says " Man, the knowing subject, will perceive at last that man, ' the object of knowledge' is the key to the whole science of nature. Man is the solution of everything that we can know." (10) This is the position from which his book has been written. It is his central point and it has many implications, most of which simply aren't accessible to those who believe that nature may be understood by the analytical method alone, and worse, view nature and humanity as no more than machines, the worst kind of unconscious anthropocentric projection that could be possible. In this statement, Teilhard is showing us an insight that is worthy of our attention and deep consideration. He is saying that, if we could but see it, our consciousness is the key by which the rest of nature may be unlocked. This has been characterised as a mystical assertion--and in our day, that is a 'bad thing', unsound, untrustworthy, unacceptable for its apparent opposition or contradiction of reason. But in fact, with Teilhard we have a person who was both strongly scientifically-inclined as well as gifted in his sensitivity to wholeness and spirituality. Out of this mix of sensibilities he was able to say humanity is a phenomenon of the cosmos and we shall know the cosmos finally by knowing ourselves.

This view is not to be characterised as Medawar and Toulmin do, as anthropocentrism and egoism at a species level. Nor is it to be side-lined as 'mere mysticism'. In my view both these interpretations are very wide of the mark. The center of which Teilhard speaks, and the human person that he perceives, are far beyond narrow egoism, and medieval constructions. It is necessary to look further at what Teilhard is saying.

In the chapter 'The Ultimate Earth', Teilhard points out that science has been reluctant to "look man in the face but has constantly circled round the human object without daring to tackle it. Materially our bodies seem insignificant, accidental, transitory and fragile; why bother about them? Psychologically, our souls are incredibly subtle and complex: how can one fit them into a world of laws and formulas?" (11) He was writing in the late 1930's, long before the advent of neuroscience and the wider field of consciousness studies. There have indeed been advances in knowledge but consciousness is studied in the traditional manner of the sciences, demarcated and walled off from other fields of research. Somehow knowledge of the structure and functioning of the brain remains as far from being able to explain the rich experience of our own minds as ever. As for being able to see a connection between our minds and the diverse laws and facts about nature as a whole, the gulf remains an incredible challenge.

The position of Teilhard, by contrast, is of interest because he is convinced that humanity is the "present terminal form of evolution"; the powers that have grown successfully in biological nature as a whole are embodied and represented and brought out in fullness in human beings. This is not a statement that the universe was designed to create human beings, or that our own convenience is paramount, or that evolution was 'directed' in the way that Toulmin and Medawar imagine he is saying. He is simply stating something that cannot be denied without falling into absurdity: human beings are the present terminal shoot of the overall process of complexification. Our power on the planet for good or for ill cannot be denied. The power is real and it becomes increasingly absurd to waste time on debates over whether nature 'intended' to evolve into thinking beings. It has done so. Teilhard argues, (and how can it be contradicted?) that humanity is:

" an object of study of unique value to science for two reasons. ( i ) He represents, individually and socially, the most synthesised state under which the stuff of the universe is available to us. (ii) Correlatively, he is at present the most mobile point of the stuff in course of transformation. For these two reasons, to decipher man is essentially to find out how the world was made and how it ought to go on making itself. The science of man is the practical and theoretical science of hominisation. It means profound study of the past and of origins. But still more, it means constructive experiment pursued on a continually renewed object. The programme is immense and its only end or aim is that of the future." (12)

Suddenly, with the relief that comes from breaking out into the open from confining spaces, there is an excitement engendered by Teilhard's words here. He is pointing us to realise that we are to investigate and understand ourselves as the " most synthesised state" of the 'stuff' of the universe. He collapses the habit of standing at a distance, and brings us to a position where our very thoughts, emotions, and dreams are a manifestation of evolutionary process. Evolution ceases to be abstract. It becomes of intense personal and collective significance, instigating a profound shift into a new state of combined subjectivity-objectivity. The holistic feeling is new, refreshing, and creative beyond measure. At once uniqueness is restored to the process and content of science, that quality by which the dynamic depths powering the universe may be experienced, not only abstracted out into equations. Instead of viewing human consciousness as a fixed and static phenomenon, to be placed neatly into a taxonomy of the 'bush of life', without intrinsic value or significance, imagined only to be an accident, Teilhard points us towards recognising that our existence is the evolutionary process itself. Our most trenchant data for understanding evolution are ourselves. And with greater understanding goes the growth of capacity to consciously evolve, instead of simply allowing an unfolding of events of planetary importance without full control or full consciousness.

It has become urgent that we know what we are doing with each and every decision, in our collective institutions and in our individual lives. For this we need every tool at our disposal, and the significance of the sciences is undisputed. But without an integral perspective on nature and humanity, providing a far more meaningful self-image and understanding, we stand to lose it all. When we know more clearly that we are in some real sense the living, breathing, thinking personification of the vast cosmos as a whole, we shall make contact with fundamental creativity and responsibility will dawn.

Although Teilhard de Chardin was by no means the first to articulate the idea that we are nature become conscious of itself, he stands unique in the history of thought because he turned directly to address the evidence uncovered by scientific discovery and took the widest possible view. Teilhard was a naturalist, his whole instinct being one that must explore and observe. His feeling for Life, for organism, for growth, is exceptionally sensitive and thoughtful and he seems, to me, to express a " re-membering", a closing back into one loop of what has been made fragmented and broken. In this, Teilhard offers us a healing of the fractured modern mind. Psyche and Physis may not, without violence to the integrity of the universe, be divided. Teilhard's work is an example of what can be done when they remain in union. May many others engage the integrity of the universe, and help to bring forth our latent wisdom.


References

1. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, Harper and Row, 1975, p. 30
2. Ibid, p. 61
3. Peter Medawar's article is to be found on the internet at: http://www.santafe.edu/~shalizi/Medawar/. I could not find the original publication
4. Teilhard de Chardin, p. 33
5. Toulmin, Stephen, The Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the Theology of Nature, University of California Press, 1982
6. Ibid, p. 118
7. Ibid, p. 126
8. Ibid, p. 122
9. Ibid, p. 120
10. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, Harper and Row, 1975, p. 281
11. Ibid, p. 281
12. Ibid, p. 281


Bibliography

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Behe, Michael J., Darwin's Black Box: the Biochemical Challenge to Evolution, Free Press, 1996

Copleston, Frederick S.J. A History of Philosophy Book Three, Image Books, 1985

Loewenstein, Werner R., The Touchstone of Life: Molecular Information, Cell Communication and the Foundations of Life, OUP, 1999

Mader, Sylvia S., Biology, W. C .Brown Publishers, 1990

Margulis, Lunn, & Sagan, Dorion, What is Life? University of California Press, 1995

Mix, Michael, Farber, Paul, King, Keith, Biology: the Network of Life, HarperCollins College Publishers, 1996

Rattray Taylor, Gordon, The Great Evolution Mystery Abacus, Sphere Books, 1982

Toulmin, Stephen. The Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the Theology of Nature, University of California Press, 1982

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